Intergenerational Educational Persistence in Europe by Schneebaum, Alyssa et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
Working Paper No. 174 
 
 
Intergenerational Educational 
Persistence in Europe 
 
Alyssa Schneebaum 
Bernhard Rumplmaier 
Wilfried Altzinger 
 
May 2014 
Intergenerational Educational Persistence in
Europe
Alyssa Schneebaum, Bernhard Rumplmaier, Wilfried Altzinger∗
Department of Economics
Vienna University of Economics and Business
April 2014
Abstract
Primarily using data from the 2010 European Social Survey, we analyze intergener-
ational educational persistence in 20 European countries, studying cross-country and
cross-cluster differences in intergenerational mobility; the role of gender in determining
educational persistence across generations; and changes in the degree of intergenera-
tional persistence over time. We find that persistence is highest in the Southern and
Eastern European countries, and lowest in the Nordic countries. While intergenera-
tional persistence in the Nordic and Southern countries has declined over time, it has
remained relatively steady in the rest of Europe. Further, we find evidence of dif-
ferences in intergenerational persistence by gender, with mothers’ education being a
stronger determinant of daughters’ (instead of sons’) education and fathers’ education
a stronger determinant of the education of their sons. Finally we see that for most
clusters differences over time are largely driven by increasing mobility for younger
women.
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1 Introduction
Since as far back as the time of Sir Francis Galton (1869; 1889), there has been little
doubt that descendants inherit at least some of their characteristics from their parents.
Today, the questions around intergenerational persistence of social and economic outcomes
are mainly not about its existence; instead, researchers are more interested in measuring
its extent, its causes, and its development over time.1
Economists have traditionally concentrated their studies of intergenerational persis-
tence on the transmission of income and wealth, while the intergenerational persistence of
educational attainment has first become a more popular topic in the last several decades.
These two sets of outcomes – monetary and educational – are certainly related, and the
mechanisms which promote or distill their intergenerational persistence can be similar.
Public policies which tax bequests and those which guarantee free and equal education to
all, for example, promote social and economic success based on meritocracy as opposed
to inheritance; a completely hands–off political system would likely result in very high
intergenerational persistence in both spheres as parents would pass on all advantages (and
disadvantages) they themselves faced to their children.
To the extent that a country’s degree of intergenerational persistence depends on public
policy, we can expect to see differences in persistence across countries. Indeed, existing
studies have found great variation in both income and educational persistence around the
world (see e.g. Solon, 2002; Hertz et al., 2007). Furthermore, the evolution of social and
economic policy over time along with changing attitudes about and access to educational
attainment is likely to have changed the strength of educational persistence across gen-
erations in the last century. Relatedly, the economic conditions and social mores which
assign particular (and distinctive) roles to men and women have evolved such that women’s
formal education is more valuable and economically worthwhile than ever before.
Thus, this paper presents an analysis of the strength of intergenerational educational
persistence across three dimensions. First, we study differences in persistence across coun-
tries and clusters of countries based on policy similarity in twenty European countries.
Given this analysis, we may be able to draw inference on the effectiveness of public policy
in promoting or hindering intergenerational persistence of educational attainment. Second,
we give an extensive examination of the role of gender in intergenerational educational
persistence, focusing on how intergenerational persistence in education differs when we
consider various combinations of the gender of the parents and descendants (father–son;
father–daughter; mother–son; mother–daughter). We ask whether men’s and women’s edu-
cational outcomes are more closely related to those of their mothers or fathers, and how the
gender dimension of this phenomenon differs across countries. Thirdly, we analyze changes
in the strength of the persistence over time, asking how the degree of the persistence has
1There is, of course, also the question of the optimal level of intergenerational persistence, which this
paper does not address. For an excellent review of the history of thought on intergenerational mobility in
economics, which does deal with this question, see Piketty (2000).
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changed for descendants born in 1920 versus 1985, and the points between. Finally, we
provide an integration of the three dimensions of the determinants of intergenerational
mobility, country clusters, gender and changes over time.
In section 2 we present the theoretical background for this work and situate the paper
in the existing literature on intergenerational educational persistence. Section 3 describes
the data and methods used for the empirical analysis, section 4 presents the results, and
we conclude by offering comments on the implications of our findings in section 5.
2 Theoretical Background
Children inherit some of their characteristics from their parents; this is true of social
and economic characteristics as well as some genetic traits.2 At least in part because of
the social, economic, and cultural capital transmitted across generations, children of highly
educated parents are more likely to be highly educated themselves than children of less
educated parents are, and lower–educated parents are more likely to raise a lower–educated
child. For example, figure 1a, which shows the average difference in education years of the
children of high– versus low–educated parents,3 shows that the educational premium of
having a highly educated parent is at least two years in all countries; in some countries, it
is well over five years. Even when examining this education year premium relative to the
average years of educational attainment in a country as in figure 1b, the benefit of having a
highly educated parent is high: in most countries, the premium is more than one quarter of
the average years of schooling attained in the country. The ordering of countries does not
change substantially when we consider the absolute or relative education premium of having
a highly educated parent, meaning that differences in the average duration of education
across countries does not help to explain the variation in the educational premium.
— Figure 1 about here —
How can we explain this persistence in educational attainment across generations? The
classic application of the human capital model to this question by Becker and Tomes (1979;
1986) says that descendants’ income is positively correlated with parental income due in
large part to parents’ investments in their descendants’ education and the awareness of
the positive effects of their doing so. An important example is the case of descendants’
pre–school attendance. Children of more highly educated or high–earning parents are more
2The question of whether it is social or biological factors which are the source or medium of the
transmission remains open. Björklund et al. (2007), using a sample of Swedish descendants, show that
both “nature” (biology) and “nurture” (environment) matter: the economic outcomes of descendants are
partly explained by the outcomes of their biological parents, and partly by those of their step- or adoptive
parents. However, Bowles and Gintis (2002) provide evidence that biology plays a relatively minor role in
the transmission process.
3Here “low–educated” parents are those with a maximum of lower secondary education (ISCED 0,1,2;
see section 3.1); while “highly educated” implies having tertiary education (ISCED 5,6). In this case the
higher education of both parents has been used.
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likely to attend pre–school or early childhood education programs (because of their costs
(see e.g. Magnuson et al., 2004, for empirical evidence from the US)), and early education
is widely recognized as having clearly positive effects on a child’s later outcomes (Heckman,
2008; Schütz et al., 2008; Cunha and Heckman, 2009; Currie and Almond, 2011; OECD,
2010).
Advantages are not only transmitted via investments in human capital. Esping-Andersen
(2005, p. 14) states that it might not be unequal investments in children’s education alone
that drives intergenerational persistence, but instead that “[i]t is in early childhood that
parental transmission is key.” It is cultural and social capital4 which is transmitted to chil-
dren from their earliest days, and which influences their social, economic, and educational
success throughout their lives. Cultural capital includes style of speech, physical appear-
ance, skills, knowledge and attitudes as well as formal educational training. How parents
project themselves in the world and to their children, then, has meaningful consequences
on the behaviors that children learn for themselves. The three forms of capital interact
with each other; more of one makes the others more easily accessible. Thus parental ad-
vantages are passed to children in part through investments in descendants’ human capital
and additionally through the culture of the family and its social networks. It is therefore
both the family and child care institutions that influence children’s early development, with
economic capital often helping to assure quality child care which perpetuates advantages
from one generation to the next.
Of course it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure most factors of an
individual’s cultural or social capital. Empirical research on intergenerational persistence
of social and economic outcomes can focus instead on the relatively reliable and easy–to–
measure data on educational attainment. Like every empirical research study, this approach
has its limitations; educational attainment does not tell the whole story of one’s economic
and social success. However, measuring the intergenerational persistence of educational
attainment can provide important information about the inheritance of cultural and human
capital.
Why study intergenerational educational persistence, instead of looking at the persis-
tence of income across generations? Right now, the literature on the intergenerational
persistence of income is much larger than that on educational attainment (see Blanden
(2013) for a survey of both). However, measuring the intergenerational persistence in ed-
ucational attainment rather than in income offers some crucial advantages; for three main
reasons, education is a more reliable outcome to measure than income. First, since income
changes through different life stages, obtaining reliable responses about lifetime earnings is
difficult, at best. Measuring education instead offers a more straightforward measure that
generally remains constant after a certain age (Nguyen et al., 2005). Second, reporting
income – or any monetary measure – is subject to response bias, whereby respondents
systematically under– or over–report their income (Bielby et al., 1977). Individuals may
4See the development of the theory of social capital in Bourdieu (1986).
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be less inclined to misreport their educational attainment, as it is a less straight–forward
measure of present well–being than income is. Finally, respondents, who are generally the
descendants in the intergenerational persistence literature, are much more likely to know
their parents’ level of education than their parents’ income at any point in time, producing
less recall bias (see e.g. Nguyen et al., 2005; Black and Devereux, 2011). Thus we measure
how similar descendants’ educational attainment is to their parents’.5
One goal of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of how public policy can af-
fect intergenerational educational mobility. Speaking more broadly about intergenerational
persistence, Becker and Tomes (1986, p. 3) say that “[t]he degree of regression toward or
away from the mean in the achievements of children compared to those of their parents is
a measure of the degree of equality of opportunity in a society.” In other words, societies
which have higher intergenerational persistence in social and economic outcomes such as
education provide less equal opportunity to their members than those with less persistence.
While there is some degree of immobility in educational attainment in all countries around
the world (Hertz et al., 2007), differences in policy structures and institutional arrange-
ments across countries can prevent or support intergenerational persistence. Indeed figure
1a shows that there is a large difference in the educational “premium” enjoyed by descen-
dants of high– versus low–educated parents across countries. Following theory and strong
results in Schütz et al. (2008), which show that greater access to pre–school programs and
later entrance into tracking programs is associated with lower intergenerational persistence
in educational success across Europe, we suggest that these differences are in part related
to variation in social policy regarding education.
As such, we expect to see changes in the degree of intergenerational persistence over
time as well as across countries, as relevant social policy evolves. Policies aimed at creat-
ing more equal chances for all members of society and increasing efforts to create welfare
systems during the last century addressed some of those factors that influence social trans-
mission. For example, the expansion of publicly funded and freely available schooling and
school supplies to Austrian children in the 1970s corresponded with a significant decline in
intergenerational educational persistence after that time (Fessler et al., 2012). To identify
these changes over time, we study persistence in educational attainment for different age
groups, thus allowing us to identify temporal changes. Interestingly, the influential work of
Hertz et al. (2007), which compares educational persistence over time for many countries,
does not find a time trend of either rising or falling intergenerational correlation of educa-
tion on a global basis. However, particular countries, such as the US and the UK, appear
to exhibit slightly decreasing persistence over time (p. 41). Conducting an investigation
of these developments over time for European countries is one aim of this paper. With a
sample of 20 countries this can be done in more detail for different educational systems.
5Another option slowly growing in the literature would be to measure the persistence of self–reported
well–being across generations. A recent study shows that results across Europe are similar to the results
we get in this paper, even along the gender dimension (Molina et al., 2011).
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Furthermore, in the existing literature, economists have largely left out an analysis of
the role of gender in intergenerational persistence; most studies look only at the educational
outcomes of fathers and their sons. Corak (2013, p. 81) notes that “[i]t is not that
studies of mothers, daughters, and the marriage market do not exist, only that father–
son analyses are more common and permit a broader set of cross–country comparisons.”
While analyzing the role of gender in intergenerational persistence complicates the story,
there is enough theoretical and empirical reason to believe that the degree and source of
the persistence differs based on the gender of the parent and descendant in question and
that these differences are an important element in the overall picture of intergenerational
persistence. Further, when and where differences exist, we may be able to comment on the
degree of inequality of opportunity for women versus men.
Two theoretical frameworks from economics and sociology shed light on why there
might be differences in educational persistence across generations depending on the gender
of the parent and the descendant studied. The first is the household production model
which first appeared in Becker and Tomes (1979; 1986) and was further developed by
Chiswick (1988) and Gang and Zimmermann (2000) to account for the role of mothers’
labor force participation in intergenerational transmission of human capital. Here mothers
alone are responsible for the home production of children’s education – a highly stylized
aspect of a household production model which nevertheless parallels the empirical reality
of mothers spending more time in education with their children than fathers (Sayer et al.,
2004; Zick et al., 2001; Leibowitz, 1974). The model further says that fathers’ education
is important to their descendants’ educational attainment only in that the fathers’ higher
education increases their earnings capacity, and some of the higher earnings are used to
invest in the descendants’ education. Mothers’ education affects their children’s educational
attainment both through earning income and through direct household production, which
are considered substitutes. As a mother’s education increases, the opportunity cost of
her home production increases, and she spends less time at home educating her children.
Thus the model predicts that father’s education has a more positive impact than mothers’
education on the educational attainment of the descendants.
The household production model does not distinguish between male and female chil-
dren. Thus a second theory of how gender matters in intergenerational educational per-
sistence, namely a theory of role models and socialization within a household, can serve
as a useful amendment to the household production model. Theory on socialization and
role models suggest that some social and behavioral characteristics are transmitted from
one generation to the next (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). An relevant example is gender
role attitudes, which are attitudes about how men and women “ought to” behave. Among
other things, these attitudes prescribe norms about the importance and appropriateness
of educational attainment for men and women. Gender role attitudes are passed from one
generation to the next (Farre and Vella, 2013). In transmitting their ideas about gender
and educational attainment to their children, parents with traditional educational attain-
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ments, i.e. where the father is more highly educated than the mother, are more likely to
encourage their sons to obtain higher education than they are to encourage their daughters.
Similarly, more highly educated mothers are likely to encourage their daughters to obtain
more education. Findings for Austria support this theory of gender role socialization in
intergenerational educational persistence (Fessler and Schneebaum, 2012).
These two theories of the relevance of gender in intergenerational educational persis-
tence, while partly in competition with each other, both suggest that the persistence in
intergenerational educational attainment will differ by the gender of the parent and the
descendant involved. While the household production model predicts that fathers are more
important for both sons and daughters, the role–model theory would imply a stronger ef-
fect of the same–gender parent on the descendant. We therefore test the hypothesis that
intergenerational persistence in educational attainment will differ by the gender of the
parent and descendant. Further we integrate the dimensions of gender, country clusters
and over–time effects to account for integrated impacts on intergenerational educational
mobility. This allows for a more detailed illustration of the interconnections of these three
dimensions and a better understanding of possible underlying causalities. It reveals for ex-
ample not only how intergenerational mobility has changed over time by gender, but also
whether different developments in country clusters originated in distinctive gender trends.
In the next section, we describe the data and methods used to test these hypotheses.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Data
Our data come from the 2010 European Social Survey (ESS) (Norwegian Social Science
Data Services, 2010), which was the fifth and (in terms of parental and descendants’ educa-
tion) most comprehensive wave of the survey.6 The ESS collects data on the International
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) level of education achieved for each respon-
dent and the respondents’ mothers and fathers. We converted the data on the ISCED
level of education into the number of years of schooling necessary to obtain that level of
education in the respondents’ countries. We did this by matching the ISCED code with
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) data on
school years needed for ISCED level achievement (UNESCO, 2012). Although there are
differences in educational systems and the level of detail collected about educational attain-
ment across countries in the ESS, converting the ISCED level into the minimum number
of years needed for a respondent’s education allows us to make the survey as objective
and homogeneous as possible. This conversion creates a more continuous measure of edu-
cational attainment, which allows us to calculate intergenerational educational elasticities
and correlations (see section 3.2 below). Blanden (2013, pp. 44–45), following Dearden et
6Italy did not participate in the survey after round 2 (2004) and the round 5 data are not yet available
for Austria, so we used data from round 2 and 4 for these countries, respectively.
6
al. (2002), points out that measuring educational achievement with the number of years
in education is not ideal for a study of intergenerational elasticities/correlations, because
it assumes that the relationship between the educational attainment of the parent and
descendant generation is linear and monotonic. However, Blanden (2013) shows that a
comparison of two international studies, one which used years of education to obtain inter-
generational elasticities/correlations (Hertz et al., 2007) and the other which used academic
degrees obtained to measure an intergenerational association of education (Chevalier et al.,
2013), yields fairly highly (0.49) positively correlated results.
We include only respondents aged 25 or older in our study, to minimize the number
of cases in which the respondents were still studying at the time of the survey. For most
of the analysis, a sample of those aged 25–65 is used, to focus on people still in the labor
market; the exception is the analysis of time trends in intergenerational correlations, where
we study all descendants up to 90 years of age. In total we observe 14,514 (11,291) men
and 16,218 (12,424) women between 25–90 (25–65) in 20 different countries. We use only
observations for which we have information on the educational attainment for both the
mother and the father of the descendant. All results are calculated using the design weight
provided in the ESS.
As shown in table 1, both men and women in the descendant population are more
highly educated than those in the parent generation; sons and daughters have, on aver-
age, more than three years more education than their same–gender counterparts in the
older generation. Men in both generations completed more years of schooling than women,
yet women are closing the gap and the overall difference between sons and daughters is
only marginal. In most countries, the daughters have completed more years of schooling
than the sons, with the only exceptions being some of the Continental and Southern coun-
tries (Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland). For the
parental generation, the situation is completely different: the mothers have fewer years
of education than the fathers. Only in Denmark, Ireland and Sweden, mothers have on
average more years of education than fathers.
— Table 1 about here —
Cross–country differences in these means are profound. Norway’s men and women
aged 25–65 have an average of 15.05 and 15.08 years of education, respectively, the highest
average in the dataset. On the other hand, men and women in Portugal have only 8.35
and 7.92 years of education, respectively. Portugal is the only country whose average years
of education for the descendants is under ten years, but there are quite a few countries in
which the parents have less than ten years of education. However these differences are in
part due to different education systems and different program lengths, meaning that an
identical ISCED–level in two different countries can be obtained from a different number of
schooling years. Our educational year averages are slightly higher than those published by
the United Nations (United Nations Development Program, 2013, p. 144) for all countries,
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very likely because our mean education years are limited to people aged 25–65, which
excludes older and thus generally less educated people. Based on this comparison, our
schooling years seem justified.
In every country in Europe, the average level of educational attainment from one gen-
eration to the next has increased. At the same time, the distribution of educational attain-
ment has become wider in the younger generation, meaning that there is greater variation
in the years of education attained by the respondents compared to their parents. This
becomes important in calculating intergenerational persistence, as explained in the next
section.
3.2 Intergenerational Elasticities and Correlations
We provide a measure of the strength of the persistence of educational attainment
in one generation to the next by calculating intergenerational educational elasticities and
correlations. The model used to estimate an intergenerational educational elasticity βˆ can
be written as
Edi = α+ βˆE
p
i + εi ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , N (1)
where Edi is the educational attainment of descendant i, and E
p
i is the average educational
attainment of both parents (father and mother) of descendant i, and εi is a normally
distributed error term with a mean of zero and a constant variance σ2. The constant α
provides a level effect, indicating the descendant’s education if the parents had zero years
of schooling. The OLS estimate βˆ is
βˆ = ρdp
σd
σp
(2)
where σd and σp represent the standard deviation in the educational distribution of the
descendant and parent populations, respectively, and ρdp is the correlation coefficient be-
tween the descendant and parent population. This exposition makes it clear to see that a
change in βˆ may not necessarily be due to a change in the relationship between the edu-
cational attainment of the two generations; a change in the distribution of the educational
attainment of either descendants or parents would also change the elasticity βˆ. Since the
distribution of educational attainment has changed drastically from one generation to the
next in practically every country in our dataset (see table 1), the elasticity would give the
wrong impression about the actual intergenerational educational mobility, overstating it
when the standard deviation of the distribution of the descendant population’s educational
attainment is higher than the parents’, and understating if it is larger for the parents.
Therefore, we estimate intergenerational educational correlations γ. These correlations
normalize the educational attainment of a population by the standard deviation of their
educational distribution (see e.g. Black and Devereux, 2011; Blanden, 2013):
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Edi
σd
= α+ γˆ
Epi
σp
+ εi ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (3)
By calculating these educational correlations, we are able to compare the strength of the
relationship of parental and descendant educational attainment across countries and over
time, although the distribution of educational attainment in these various subpopulations
may be quite different.
Finally, in calculating gender–specific elasticities and correlations, we model the rela-
tionship between the educational attainment of a descendant and both their mother and
father.7 We use both parents’ educational attainment (separately, while controlling for
the other (see e.g. Gang and Zimmermann, 2000)) in order to be able to tease out the
gender–specific nature of intergenerational persistence. Thus we model
Edi = α+ βˆ1E
f
i + βˆ2E
m
i + βˆ3(E
f
i ∗ δ) + βˆ4(Emi ∗ δ) + βˆ5(δ) + εi ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , N (4)
for the gender specific intergenerational elasticities and
Edi
σd
= α+ γˆ1
Efi
σf
+ γˆ2
Emi
σm
+ γˆ3(
Efi
σf
∗ δ) + γˆ4(E
m
i
σm
∗ δ) + γˆ5(δ) + εi ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , N (5)
for the gender–specific intergenerational correlations, where Ef is the educational attain-
ment of the father and Em is that of the mother, and δ is a dummy variable equal to 0
for sons and 1 for daughters. We interact parental education with the gender dummy vari-
able to capture the differing relationship of parental (mother and father) education with
descendant education for sons and daughters. βˆ1 (γˆ1) will give us the intergenerational
elasticity (correlation) between the educational attainment of fathers and sons; βˆ2 (γˆ2) for
mothers and sons; βˆ1 + βˆ3 (γˆ1 + γˆ3) for fathers and daughters; and βˆ2 + βˆ4 (γˆ2 + γˆ4) for
mothers and daughters. Lastly, βˆ5 (γˆ5) is the coefficient on a control variable for gender,
which is positive (negative) when daughters have higher (lower) education than sons.
3.3 Country Clustering
Some countries are more alike than others in their social welfare state policies regarding
education. The strength of the intergenerational persistence of education is related to, and
indeed in some sense a function of, social policy which promotes meritocratic ideals (or
not). Therefore, we analyze intergenerational educational mobility in countries alone and
7Indeed most studies use only the education level of the father. As far as we know the literature,
earlier studies which estimated a joint effect of mothers and fathers dealt with differences in the education
level of the two parents by taking the average of both the father’s and the mother’s education to build
the parental education variable (e.g. Hertz et al., 2007). In an Austrian study, Fessler et al. (2012, pp.
77–78) say that due to assortative mating of the parents, taking the average or taking the maximum of
the parents’ education leads to very similar results.
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as a part of so–called “country clusters”. Clustering countries together is not a trivial task;
here we explain how we formed clusters for this analysis.
As explained in Beblavy et al. (2011), clustering countries for analyses such as this
one can follow any of several lines of thought: the clusters can be built based purely on
institutionalized educational arrangements (such as whether schools are universal or dif-
ferentiated); by linking aspects of the educational system to those of the labor market
(for example studying emphasis on group work in schools and in industrial organizations);
or by looking at models of public education in terms of their contributions to social wel-
fare. Using the first method, Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Warner (2007) build four clusters
of (mostly) European countries with similar educational systems. Green (1991) uses the
second method, which links a country’s educational system with labor market outcomes
to form five clusters, but focuses mainly on educational models in higher education, which
are not completely compatible with this study.
The third approach, which is employed here, links public welfare systems and the
educational system following the country–clustering typology of Esping-Andersen (1990).
This approach assumes that a trade–off between educational spending and spending on
other welfare policies exists, in particular that states decide whether to spend money on
education policy now to avoid having to make transfers afterwards (because education
should presumably protect people from needing public support later on) or to focus on
social insurance programs instead of education. Consequently Esping-Andersen (1990)
defines three types of welfare states: the liberal or Anglo–Saxon model, that invests mainly
in education; the conservative–corporatist or Continental model, that tends towards social
insurance; and the social–democratic or Nordic model, that spends on both welfare policies.
Apart from these three “worlds of welfare capitalism,” several scholars have proposed
additions, with many of them including a Southern or Mediterranean type of welfare state
cluster (Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997). This Mediterranean group of countries are character-
ized by fragmented social security systems and high reliance on family structures for social
and economic welfare (Ferrera, 1996). The question of whether the Eastern European
countries can be incorporated into the existing clusters or whether they form a distinctive
group of their own has been a matter of discussion. Fenger (2007) uses hierarchical cluster
analysis to find a classification for Central and Eastern European countries, finding overall
support for a separate Eastern European cluster despite differences within the cluster. The
results point out that those Central and Eastern European countries used in the current
study can be grouped into one cluster, characterized by steady economic development and
simultaneously with a more egalitarian society, especially in comparison to Russia, Belarus
or Moldova (Fenger, 2007, p. 24).
Several papers in the sociology of education literature find that the landmark work
on identifying and defining country clusters by welfare regime policy by Esping-Andersen
(1990) can be generally applied to fit cross–national educational policy differences. Peter
et al. (2010), for example, analyze 2003 Programme for International Student Assessment
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(PISA) test scores within and across both schools and countries, and find that there is
the most across–school inequality in math, reading, and science scores in countries in
the conservative (Continental) cluster, and the least inequality in the social democratic
(Nordic) cluster. They find relatively low within–school inequality in the Conservative
countries, which may be surprising on first glance, but which the authors explain to be
a function of the early tracking programs in most of the countries in this cluster, which
separated low– and high–achieving students from an early age.
Thus we use a five–type model of welfare states, including an Anglo–Saxon cluster
(Ireland and the UK), a Nordic cluster (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), a Con-
tinental cluster (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland), a
Southern cluster (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and an Eastern European cluster
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland).8 As documented in the existing litera-
ture, the countries within each cluster share a similar welfare system and therefore provide
hints regarding the relationship between different welfare and education policies and in-
tergenerational educational persistence. Nevertheless differences in welfare systems and
educational mobility between some countries within clusters still exist; these differences
will be discussed in further detail below.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Intergenerational Educational Persistence by Country and Cluster
We begin the analysis of our empirical results with an examination of intergenerational
persistence across countries and country clusters. Table 2 presents the intergenerational
educational correlations between parents and their working–age (25–65) descendants in
20 European countries We focus our description on the correlations presented in table 2
instead of the elasticities, because – as described in section 3.2 – the correlations give a
better measure of persistence across generations, since they eliminate the possibility that
the intergenerational relationship is based in part on structural changes to the educational
distribution across generations.9
— Table 2 about here —
The bottom row of table 2 shows that the intergenerational correlation between all
parents and all descendants (equation 3) is rather high, at 0.486. Thus, after accounting
8When performing analyses by cluster, we take averages of the results for each country in the cluster,
which gives each country an equal “weight” in determining cluster–level effects, regardless of differences in
populations across countries in a cluster.
9The elasticities are shown in table A.1 in the appendix. For almost all countries and clusters, the
correlation between parent’s and descendant’s educational attainment is higher than the elasticity. This
result occurs because in these populations, the standard deviation of the parental educational distribution
is generally larger than in the descendant population (see equation 2, and the relevant descriptive statistics
in table 1).
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for differences in the distribution of educational attainment across generations, a one year
increase in parental education is correlated with an additional half year of schooling for the
descendants. This estimate is consistent with those of Hertz et al. (2007); in the thirteen
countries that their analysis has in common with this one, they get an average correlation
of 0.40. Their estimate is lower than our overall estimate because our analysis includes
seven additional countries, all of which have higher intergenerational correlations.
Table 2 reveals that intergenerational educational persistence is quite different across
our five country clusters. The educational correlation between all parents and all descen-
dants is the lowest in the Nordic cluster, at 0.433, while it is 0.478 for the Continental
and 0.490 for the Anglo–Saxon clusters. The highest correlations are found in the Eastern
and Southern clusters, with intergenerational correlations of 0.520 and 0.517, respectively.
These results indicate quite a bit of variation of intergenerational educational mobility
across Europe. The five country clusters have a wide range of intergenerational correla-
tions.
Looking closer at the correlations on the country level reveals that the four Nordic
nations are all among those countries with the lowest correlations. Furthermore the inter-
generational correlations in the four Nordic countries are rather similar, ranging from just
0.406 (Denmark) to 0.454 (Norway). The two Anglo–Saxon countries (the UK at 0.461
and Ireland at 0.519) show similar (to each other) but distinctly higher (than the Nordic
countries) correlation rates. The other clusters do not reveal these clear similarities inside
the clusters themselves.
Some countries within the Continental cluster have a similar intergenerational correla-
tion (the range for Austria, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland is between just 0.447
and 0.485), but Belgium shows exceptionally high persistence (0.570), and Germany shows
remarkably low persistence (0.412).
The Southern countries are among the least mobile ones, but with especially high cor-
relations for Portugal (0.553) and Spain (0.588). However, one nation in this relatively
high–persistence cluster, Greece, places in the group of the most mobile countries in Eu-
rope, with an intergenerational correlation of 0.425.
Finally, the countries in the Eastern cluster have the highest correlations, but again
there are two exceptions. On the one hand, this generally highly persistent cluster contains
the Czech Republic, which turns out to be the most mobile country in this dataset with
an intergenerational correlation of 0.400. On the other hand, the cluster also contains
Bulgaria, which is the the least mobile country in the sample with an intergenerational
correlation of 0.620.
Overall, although we observe quite a strong variation in the intergenerational correla-
tions across country clusters with results ranging from 0.400 in the Czech Republic and
0.406 in Denmark to 0.588 in Spain and 0.620 in Bulgaria, there exists educational persis-
tence in all European countries. The cluster–level analysis shows the Nordic cluster is the
least persistent, and the Eastern and Southern clusters are the most.
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4.2 The Gendered Nature of Intergenerational Educational Persistence
Table 2 presents intergenerational educational correlations by the gender of the parent
and the descendant, in the columns titled father–son, mother–son, father–daughter, and
mother–daughter. These are the estimates for γ1, γ2, γ1 + γ3, and γ2 + γ4 from equation
5, respectively. The last column of the table, titled female, gives the coefficients for the
dummy variable on the gender of the descendant (γ5 in equation 5), showing whether being
female is linked with a higher (positive value) or lower (negative value) education than that
of the male descendants.
The differences in the intergenerational correlations across gender–pairs are rather strik-
ing. Across Europe, fathers are more influential for the education of the sons than mothers
are, in the sense that the persistence of educational outcomes between fathers and sons is
higher than for any other gender pair: the averages across Europe show that the correlation
between fathers and sons (0.331) is higher than between mothers and sons (0.185). Some
exceptions to this rule do exist; in Portugal, the persistence between mothers and sons is
stronger than that between fathers and sons. Fathers’ educational attainment also appears
to be more important for sons than it is for daughters (across Europe the intergenerational
correlation is 0.331 compared to 0.259), as predicted by the socialization model discussed
in section 2, which says that descendants would follow more closely in their same–gender
parents’ educational path than in their cross–gender parents’. In Belgium, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, the UK, Italy and Portugal this is not the case, although these differences are
small, except in Italy.
Similarly, the relationship between the educational attainment of mothers and their
daughters is stronger than between mothers and their sons. Again these results support
the role–model discussion presented in section 2. The average correlation of educational
years between mothers and daughters is 0.290, compared to 0.185 between mothers and
sons. It is rather remarkable that only in Belgium, Finland, and the UK, the persistence
between mothers’ and sons’ educational attainment is stronger than between mothers and
daughters, and in the latter two countries, those differences are very small. On average,
the correlation between fathers’ and daughters’ education (0.259) is weaker than between
mothers and daughters (0.290), although there is variation on a country level, this is true
for all Eastern and Nordic countries.
Finally, the last row of table 2 gives the coefficient on the female dummy variable in
equation 5. The magnitude of this coefficient is not straightforward to interpret, because
the outcome variable is the years of education divided by the standard deviation of the
education years in a country. However, the sign of the coefficient tells us whether it is
men or women in a country who have completed more years of education. The results are
consistent with those in table 1.
The household production model discussed in section 2 predicts that fathers’ increased
educational attainment always has a positive effect on the (genderless) children’s educa-
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tional attainment, while an increase in mothers’ educational attainment has an ambiguous
effect. Our results show that the hypothesis is correct, insofar that fathers’ increased ed-
ucational attainment has a positive effect on children’s educational attainment, and this
effect is generally (but not always) stronger than it is from mothers’ increased education.
The results further show, though, that there are seemingly systematic differences in the
strength of the intergenerational persistence based on the gender of the parent and descen-
dant in question. Fathers’ education is more strongly correlated to sons’, while mothers’
education is more strongly related to daughters’. In general, though, sons’ education is
more strongly related to their parents’ education than that of daughters. While in many
countries it is the fathers whose educational attainment is strongly correlationed to the ed-
ucation levels ofboth sons and daughters, in the Nordic and Eastern countries it is mothers’
education that appears to be more strongly correlated with daughters’ education.
4.3 Changes in Intergenerational Educational Persistence Over Time
The previous two sub–sections analyzed intergenerational educational persistence in
Europe for people of working age (25–65). While illuminating, these findings are limited
to this age group. In this section, we broaden our analysis to the population of respondents
between 25 and 90 years old, and examine how the intergenerational educational correlation
has developed over time. This analysis studies the correlation between all descendants and
all parents (regardless of gender), where parental education years are taken to be the
average of a descendant’s mother’s and father’s educational attainment.
Figure 2 shows the average intergenerational correlation per age group (in 1–year co-
horts; thus all people born in a certain year) in each country cluster, with a fitted line with
slope τ10 to show the development of the correlation over time. The Nordic and Southern
clusters show a clear and statistically significant decline in intergenerational mobility, while
there has not been a significant change in the intergenerational educational correlation for
adults between the ages of twenty–five and ninety in the three other clusters.
— Figure 2 about here —
In the Nordic cluster, there was a clear decline in intergenerational persistence from
about 0.500 for those aged 90 to 0.350 for respondents aged 25. For the Southern countries,
there is also a significant drop in the correlation, starting from the highest point of all
clusters (0.600) and going down to slightly above 0.400 for the 25 year–old descendants.
These results are highly statistically significant. In the Eastern, Continental and Anglo–
Saxon clusters, the level of intergenerational persistence has not changed much over time,
but with a slight downward trend in the Continental and Anglo–Saxon clusters and a
10The OLS equation employed to fit the line is γac = α + τ1ageac + εac, where γ are intergenerational
educational correlations, α is a constant term and ε is an error term with the usual properties for every
age group a in each country c. The cluster correlations are taken as the average of the τ coefficients for
the cluster.
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constant trend in the Eastern cluster. Note that in some countries within these clusters
there are significant changes over time (see figure A.1), but there is no consistent pattern
within the cluster.
There is greater variance in the intergenerational correlation over age in some clusters
compared to others. The correlations in the Eastern cluster huddle fairly consistently
around 0.500 over time, with more variance for the older groups, as in the Continental
cluster, at slightly lower correlations. Interestingly, the data also do not indicate any change
for the time after the transformation in 1989. The Anglo–Saxon and Southern clusters show
the greatest variance, especially for older age cohorts, which could be due to the smaller
number of observations of descendants aged 65 and above. The average intergenerational
correlation in the Nordic cluster appears to be well below 0.500, confirming the results
discussed in section 4.1 that this cluster has the lowest intergenerational persistence. The
average correlation over age appears to be highest in the Eastern and Southern clusters.
These results fit the rationalization of our country clustering, which says that countries
in those clusters are less inclined to policy to expand access to education. The general
downward trends in the Continental, Nordic, Anglo–Saxon and Southern clusters also
fit the policy profile of those clusters: over the last ninety years, access to education has
expanded. Interestingly, there is no such evidence for the Eastern European countries in our
sample, implying that despite aiming at societal equality via state socialism, educational
persistence is rather high and has remained steady for almost a century. Yet we note that
our sample of Eastern Europe is restricted to only four countries, which each have very
different developments of educational persistence. However, looking at the trend on the
country level (see appendix figure A.1), one sees that – with the exception of Bulgaria –
intergenerational persistence has decreased over time in all countries.
Thus, we see significant changes to intergenerational educational persistence over time
in Nordic and Southern countries, with the youngest cohorts in the Southern cluster now
reaching correlation rates similar to those in other clusters, despite the relatively high
persistence faced by older descendants in that cluster. In Continental, Anglo-Saxon and
Eastern countries, the intergenerational persistence did not change significantly over time.
More research, especially from political scientists, would complement this analysis nicely,
in that it would help explain which political mechanisms foster or hinder intergenerational
persistence, and how and why they differ across countries.
4.4 An Integration of the Results
After having examined differences in intergenerational persistence by country and coun-
try cluster, gender, and age separately in sections 4.1–4.3, we now integrate these three
dimensions of socio–demographic difference into a single analysis. Figure 3 shows the
development of the average intergenerational correlation for five–year cohorts by country
clusters over time, for men and women separately. These age cohorts are larger (five years
instead of one year) than those used in section 4.3 because the split by gender makes the
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sample sizes too small for some years. Thus, to get more representative results, we use
five–year cohorts.11
A line fitting the equation γcg = αcg + Φ ∗ agecohortcg + εcg for the subsamples of each
country–cluster c and gender g predicts the intergenerational correlation γ by age cohort.
— Figure 3 about here —
A first result from figure 3 is that intergenerational educational persistence does vary
greatly by country cluster, gender, and age, and that its development over time is very
different for these different socio–demographic groups. For all ten groups shown in figure
3, educational persistence has either stayed the same or sunk over time (positive Φ), but
persistence has not increased. Eastern men are the only exception, showing a slightly
negative Φ (rising persistence over time), though this result is not statistically significant.
In half of the countries the change in the persistence over time is small and statistically
insignificant, while in the others – such as women in the Southern cluster – the development
is very strongly positive and statistically significant. Thus these three socio–demographic
groups experience the strength of the change in intergenerational educational persistence
over time quite differently.
Further, there are differences in the degree of intergenerational persistence that mem-
bers of these ten groups face at any point in time. For the descendants who were 25–29
years old in 2010, the degree of intergenerational correlation took on a large range of values
across clusters, from about 0.300 for women in the Nordic cluster to about 0.550 for men
in the Eastern cluster. Similarly, when the respondents were 80–90 years old in 2010, the
persistence also varied tremendously across country cluster: men of that age in the Nordic
cluster faced intergenerational correlations of about 0.425, while women in the Southern
cluster faced much higher persistence, at about 0.650. Even within a cluster, men and
women faced different degrees of intergenerational persistence; only in the Continental
cluster do men and women have similar correlations all along the age distribution.
Finally, figure 3 shows the necessity of including all three of these dimensions of dif-
ference into an analysis of the determinants of intergenerational persistence. An example
of the relevance of gender will illuminate. In figure 2 and the accompanying discussion
in section 4.3, we saw that there was a statistically significant drop in intergenerational
persistence over time in the Nordic and Southern clusters. When we look more closely at
the gendered nature of these changes using figure 3, though, we see that it is only female
descendants who experienced declining intergenerational persistence over time; the men
in these clusters show no significant change in persistence over time. Thus, while figure 2
provided insight regarding differences in changes over time by cluster, including the gender
analysis in figure 3 provided a more complete account of how intergenerational persistence
changed over time, and for whom.
11Since there are some cases in which there are no men or women over 80 in a country or a cluster, we
use an eleven–year cohort (ages 80–90) for this group.
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5 Discussion and Conclusions
This analysis of intergenerational educational persistence across Europe has shown that
people’s educational attainment is influenced by that of their parents. Across Europe, an
additional year of education for parents is correlated with an additional half year of edu-
cation for descendants. However, this estimate is the average intergenerational correlation
across Europe; indeed the strength of the relationship between parental and descendant ed-
ucation differs greatly by country. While the Nordic countries generally show lower rates
of persistence (ranging from 0.406 to 0.454), it is especially the Southern and Eastern
European nations that reveal higher persistence (with correlations up to 0.620).
This paper further shows the highly relevant role of gender in understanding intergen-
erational educational persistence. Across Europe, it is the fathers whose education is the
critical determinant of sons’ educational attainment, while mothers’ educational attain-
ment matters most for their daughters’ education. In most countries, fathers’ education
is also more influential for the educational attainment of the sons than for that of the
daughters. Yet daughters are especially dependent on the education of their mothers in
the Nordic and Eastern countries, as well as in France. These results show that the gender
of both the parent and the descendant is crucially important in passing on educational
advantages or disadvantages from one generation to the next. The household production
model discussed in section 2 therefore does not adequately predict the relationship between
parental and descendant education. This may be because the model does not reflect the
modern reality of women’s high labor force participation and changing social norms, which
hold fathers responsible for children’s education as much as mothers. Instead, the patterns
of the strength of the intergenerational correlations by gender suggest that gender role
attitudes and role models within a household are important in determining people’s edu-
cational attainment, as descendants are most likely to follow in their same–gender parents’
educational footsteps.
These findings can have important implications for policy aimed at reducing and elim-
inating the gender wage gap and gender–based occupational segregation. These gaps are
explained in large part by women’s occupational choice, labor market supply (the number
of hours spent in the labor market), and labor market discrimination. For all these reasons
(which also overlap each other), women’s investment in higher education does not pay off
as much as men’s. Public policy offering universal and high quality child care can help
bridge the gap between high education and labor market equality for women. First, child
care can be made high–quality, by demanding more highly educated caregivers, and pro-
viding high–paying jobs for highly educated employees – who are, in that sector, mainly
women. Second, it would promote women’s employment in other sectors which demand
highly educated workers with flexible schedules by providing care for their children while
they are at work. Thus women’s labor market supply could increase and women could
become more willing to enter traditionally male fields. At the same time, the stereotype
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of women being uncommitted to work would fade as their opportunities to do more work
expand. These changes could reduce discrimination against women, further enhancing the
first two effects. The children of these highly educated mothers – and especially daughters,
following the results in this paper – would benefit by positive gains to their own education,
by having more income in the household, by receiving better childcare, and by having a
positive role model in the household. Thus a virtuous circle of women’s advancement in
the labor market could develop.
Finally, taking the analysis some decades back and looking at those born in 1920 and
afterwards, we find that intergenerational educational persistence has decreased in Nordic
and Southern countries, while there has been no significant change in the rest of Europe.
However taking a closer look by gender gives a more nuanced story. In the Anglo-Saxon
cluster it is only men who show a significant decrease in their intergenerational educational
persistence; in the Continental cluster both men and women experienced a significant de-
cline in the intergenerational persistence; and the Eastern European countries reveal no
significant change in persistence over time. On the other hand the Nordic and Southern
countries the downward trend we observe for the entire cluster is very clearly driven by
decreases in intergenerational persistence for women. Indeed the persistence has not signif-
icantly changed for men in neither of these clusters and persistence for men in the Southern
countries remains relatively high. Thus this analysis shows the importance of studying not
only cross–country differences in intergenerational mobility but also differences over time
and by gender.
The positive results for the Nordic countries – low persistence, which has become even
lower over time – suggest that other countries looking to reduce their intergenerational
persistence could learn from Nordic social policy. In general, an important lesson from
this paper is that the intergenerational persistence in educational outcomes is variable and
depends on institutional context and historical period. Thus, it can change: movement to-
wards more meritocratic ideals (hence lower intergenerational persistence) will be a matter
of social commitment to these goals.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1a: Unconditional educational premium (in years) for descendants of high versus
low educated parents, by country
Figure 1b: Educational premium (in years) relative to country educational averages for
descendants of high versus low educated parents
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Table 1: Descriptives Statistics on Educational Attainment, Respondents Aged 25-65
Country Sample Size Average Years Standard Deviation
All Male Descendants 11291 12.71 3.56
Female Descendants 12424 12.66 3.61
Fathers 23715 9.49 4.42
Mothers 23715 8.94*** 4.19
Austria Male Descendants 672 12.32 2.29
Female Descendants 769 12.18 2.39
Fathers 1441 11.08 2.69
Mothers 1441 10.12 2.62
Belgium Male Descendants 472 12.56 3.32
Female Descendants 531 12.82 3.08
Fathers 1003 9.57 4.27
Mothers 1003 8.93*** 4.01
Bulgaria Male Descendants 677 11.96 3.29
Female Descendants 814 12.33* 3.62
Fathers 1491 9.55 3.78
Mothers 1491 9.35*** 3.96
Czech Republic Male Descendants 831 12.87 2.01
Female Descendants 794 13.03 2.03
Fathers 1625 12.21 2.22
Mothers 1625 11.73*** 2.26
Denmark Male Descendants 502 14.24 3.08
Female Descendants 487 14.33 2.92
Fathers 989 10.29 4.11
Mothers 989 10.54** 4.22
Finland Male Descendants 605 12.76 4.11
Female Descendants 569 13.45*** 3.48
Fathers 1174 8.25 5.36
Mothers 1174 8.15 4.91
France Male Descendants 476 11.89 3.43
Female Descendants 543 12.28* 3.30
Fathers 1019 8.15 4.11
Mothers 1019 7.27*** 3.69
Germany Male Descendants 885 14.24 2.45
Female Descendants 884 13.77*** 2.59
Fathers 1769 12.85 2.82
Mothers 1769 11.55*** 2.69
Greece Male Descendants 574 12.19 3.53
Female Descendants 789 11.97 3.37
Fathers 1363 5.81 3.97
Mothers 1363 5.06*** 3.45
Hungary Male Descendants 477 11.75 2.85
Female Descendants 538 12.13** 3.02
Fathers 1015 9.60 3.57
Mothers 1015 9.04*** 3.46
Continued on next page...
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Table 1: continued
Country Sample Size Average Years Standard Deviation
Ireland Male Descendants 691 13.84 3.33
Female Descendants 854 13.95 3.21
Fathers 1545 9.86 3.92
Mothers 1545 10.19*** 3.73
Italy Male Descendants 496 11.31 4.12
Female Descendants 521 10.94 4.26
Fathers 1017 7.41 3.68
Mothers 1017 6.69*** 3.00
Netherlands Male Descendants 503 14.71 3.94
Female Descendants 635 13.89*** 3.70
Fathers 1138 11.35 4.12
Mothers 1138 9.99*** 3.18
Norway Male Descendants 540 15.05 2.60
Female Descendants 466 15.08 2.70
Fathers 1006 12.72 3.64
Mothers 1006 11.89*** 3.39
Poland Male Descendants 534 12.77 2.59
Female Descendants 548 13.47*** 2.67
Fathers 1082 10.34 3.23
Mothers 1082 10.28 3.24
Portugal Male Descendants 458 8.35 4.40
Female Descendants 653 7.92 4.41
Fathers 1111 3.91 3.25
Mothers 1111 3.45*** 3.26
Spain Male Descendants 620 11.62 4.45
Female Descendants 614 11.74 4.58
Fathers 1234 6.79 4.99
Mothers 1234 5.94*** 4.37
Sweden Male Descendants 388 12.75 2.55
Female Descendants 416 13.18** 2.74
Fathers 804 9.39 4.14
Mothers 804 9.46 3.90
Switzerland Male Descendants 477 13.40 2.88
Female Descendants 451 13.10 3.15
Fathers 928 11.43 3.70
Mothers 928 10.05*** 3.29
United Kingdom Male Descendants 413 12.38 3.81
Female Descendants 548 12.46 3.60
Fathers 961 9.52 4.03
Mothers 961 9.03*** 3.53
Notes: Authors’ calculations on weighted ESS data. Statistically significant differences in
means for men versus women and mothers versus fathers are indicated with ***(p<.01),
**(p<.05), or *(p<.10).
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Figure 2: Educational correlations over age of descendants (25–90 years) by country clus-
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